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Abstract: A method is given for resolving a matrix of preference scores into a
well-specified mixture of options. This is done in agreement with several desirable
properties, including the continuity of the mixing proportions with respect to the
preference scores and a condition of compatibility with the Condorcet–Smith majority
principle. These properties are achieved by combining the classical rating method
of Zermelo with a projection procedure introduced in previous papers of the same
authors.
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A vote is an expression of the preferences of several individuals about
certain options with a view towards reaching a common decision. Gen-
erally speaking, the decision need not be choosing a single option, but
it can also take the form of mixing a number of them according to certain
proportions. For instance, one could be dividing a prize among several
contenders, or a budget among several items. This article is aimed at a
method for suitably determining the proportions of such mixed collective
choices.
The input from which we set ourselves to derive these proportions or
mixing fractions is the matrix of preference scores of Ramon Llull and
Condorcet [16, §3, §7], i. e. the matrix that compares each option to
every other in terms of the number of voters who prefer the former to
the latter.
Assume, for instance, that a committee of 18 people must decide how
to distribute a budget among four items a, b, c, d and that they express
the following preferences:
(1) 10: a>b>c>d, 3: b>c>d>a, 3: c>d>b>a, 2: d>b>a>c.
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The number in front of each ranking indicates how many people ex-
pressed it. One can work out that a is preferred to b by 10 people
against 8, b is preferred to c by 15 against 3, et cetera. These numbers
are collected in the following table, that we call the Llull matrix of the
vote:1
(2)
a 10 12 10
8 b 15 13
6 3 c 16
8 5 2 d
.
In which proportions should the budget be divided?
Notice that the individual votes cannot be recovered from the Llull
matrix. Therefore, our setting is not suitable for the purpose of propor-
tional representation, which has to do with mapping the electorate onto
the elected options and therefore requires more information than just the
Llull matrix of the vote. However, our setting still seems appropriate for
distributing a prize or a budget between different options in accordance
with their relative merits as summarized in the Llull matrix.
In the preceding example the preferential information is complete:
since every voter has ordered all the options, the preference scores for
any ordered pair of options and its opposite add up to the total number
of voters. Generally speaking, however, it need not be so. For instance,
voters could give only truncated rankings, where no preferences are ex-
pressed between the non-mentioned options. The method that we are
looking for should be able to deal also with such situations of incom-
plete preferences. An extreme case is that where every voter confines to
choosing a single option. In this case, the mixing fractions should cer-
tainly coincide with the respective vote fractions. We will refer to this
requirement as single-choice voting consistency.
Assume, for instance, that 100 voters express themselves in the fol-
lowing way:
(3) 54 : a, 22 : b, 13 : c, 11 : d.
That is, 54 voters express their preference for a over any of the three other
options, but they do not give any information about their preferences
between b, c, and d; the other voters act similarly in connection with
1Since we are interested only in the preferences of x over y for x 6= y, we use the
diagonal cells for specifying the simultaneous labelling of rows and columns by the
existing options. The cell located in row x and column y gives information about the
preference of x over y.
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other options. One easily checks that the Llull matrix of this vote takes
the following form:
(4)
a 54 54 54
22 b 22 22
13 13 c 13
11 11 11 d
.
The condition of single-choice voting consistency requires that in such a
situation the mixing fractions shoud be (0.54, 0.22, 0.13, 0.11).
Priority ratings are often used only for ranking purposes. However,
in this article we are interested in mixing fractions per se, i. e. as an
expression of which specific share of prize or burden should be allotted
to every option. In consonance with such a quantitative character, we
require a continuous dependence of the mixing fractions on the preference
scores.
On the other hand, the mixing-fraction character that we are looking
for calls also for the following condition of unanimous decomposition,
that we divide in two parts: (a) If every option from a set X is unani-
mously preferred to any option from outside X, then the mixing fractions
should vanish outside of X. In particular, if an option is unanimously
preferred to any other, then it should get a mixing fraction equal to 1
and all the other mixing fractions should be equal to 0. (b) In the com-
plete case the following converse statement should hold too: if X is the
set of options that get non-vanishing fractions, then each option from
X is unanimously preferred to any option from outside X; besides, X is
the minimal set with this property.
Consider, for instance, the preferences
(5) 60 : a > b > c > d, 40 : b > a > d > c,
whose corresponding Llull matrix is
(6)
a 60 100 100
40 b 100 100
0 0 c 60
0 0 40 d
.
According to the condition of unanimous decomposition, in such a situ-
ation the only options with non-vanishing fractions should be a and b.
Notice also that in the case of Example (1), whose Llull matrix is (2),
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part (b) of the condition of unanimous decomposition requires that every
option should receive a positive fraction.
Our problem can be seen as a special case of a more general one where
a matrix of paired-comparison scores is to be summed up into a set of
priority ratings (not necessarily with the character of mixing fractions).
Such a problem arises not only in preferential voting, but also in sport
tournaments, psychometrics, multi-criteria decision theory, web search
engine rankings, et cetera. See for instance [4, 9, 14].
However, voting has a special character in that the comparisons are
decided by human individuals. Because of this, it becomes advisable
to comply with certain majority principles. In the paired-comparison
setting, the standard formulation is the Condorcet principle (see [16,
Ch. 1, §4.2], [19, §7.2], and [22, p. 153–154]): If the preference scores
of a particular option over the others are all of them greater than half
the number of voters, then that option should be socially preferred to
any other. In our setting, being socially preferred means simply getting
a larger fraction. More generally, we will consider also the following
extended version, which was introduced in 1973 by John H. Smith [20,
§5] (except for the provision of vanishing fractions) and will be referred
to as Condorcet–Smith principle: if the options are partitioned in two
sets X and Y so that every member of X is preferred to any member of
Y by more than half of the voters, then every member of X should get
a larger fraction than any member of Y unless both fractions vanish.
According to this condition, in the case of (1)–(2) the mixing frac-
tions should decrease along the order a > b > c > d (take successively
X = {a}, {a, b}, {a, b, c}).
As we will see, the conditions of single-choice voting consistency, conti-
nuity and unanimous decomposition are satisfied by a celebrated method
that was introduced in 1929 by Ernst Zermelo in the context of chess
tournaments [24]. However, Zermelo’s method by itself does not com-
ply with the Condorcet principle. In fact, it need not give the largest
fraction to an option that is placed first by more than half of the vot-
ers. For instance, in the case of (1)–(2) it gives the following fractions:
a: 0.303, b: 0.387, c: 0.201, d: 0.109, where b gets the largest fraction
in spite of the fact that a has a majority of first placings. As we will
show in this article, this problem disappears when Zermelo’s method is
preceded by the CLC projection that is introduced in [1, 2] (“CLC”
stands for “Continuous Llull–Condorcet”). In the case of (1)–(2), this
combined procedure gives the following results: a: 0.323, b: 0.288, c:
0.217, d: 0.173.
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The resulting method, that is, the CLC projection followed by Zer-
melo’s method, combines, among others, the following properties: frac-
tion character, including the above-mentioned conditions of single-choice
voting consistency and unanimous decomposition, continuity with re-
spect to the original preference scores, and compliance with the Con-
dorcet–Smith principle. To our knowledge, the previous literature does
not offer any other rating method with these properties.
The reader interested to try the proposed method can use the CLC cal-
culator which has been made available at [18].
This article is structured as follows. In Section 1 we introduce some
general terminology and notation. Section 2 is devoted to Zermelo’s
method by itself, with some new results, especially in connection with
the continuous dependence of the ratings on the data in the reducible
case. Section 3 looks at certain properties of the paired-comparison ma-
trices that arise from the CLC projection of [1, 2]. Section 4 combines
the previous results to show that the concatenation of the CLC projec-
tion and Zermelo’s method achieves the desired properties. Finally, in
Section 5 we ask ourselves for the possibility of other methods with the
same properties and we discuss some related questions.
1. Terminology and notation
1.1. We consider a finite set A. Its elements represent the options
which are the matter of a vote. The number of elements of A will be de-
noted by N . We will be based upon the numbers of voters who expressed
a preference for x over y, where x and y vary over all ordered pairs of dif-
ferent options. These numbers will be denoted by Vxy. Instead of them,
most of the time we will be dealing with the fractions vxy = Vxy/V ,
where V denotes the total number of votes. We will refer to Vxy and
vxy respectively as the absolute and relative preference scores associated
with the ordered pair xy, and the whole collection of these scores will be
called the (absolute or relative) Llull matrix of the vote.
The preference scores are obviously bound to satisfy the inequality
(7) vxy + vyx ≤ 1.
A matrix of preference scores satisfying vxy + vyx = 1 for any x and y
will be said to be complete.
Incomplete Llull matrices arise when preferences are not expressed
by some voters on some pairs of options. In this connection, one must
be careful to distinguish a definite indifference about two options from
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a lack of information about them. One voter who expresses a definite
indifference about x and y should be considered equivalent to half a voter
preferring x to y plus another half a voter preferring y to x. In contrast,
a voter who gives no information about whether he prefers x to y or
viceversa should be counted neither in Vxy nor in Vyx.
In this spirit, a ballot that confines to choosing a single option should
be interpreted as expressing nothing else than a preference for that op-
tion over any other. Therefore, in the case of single-choice voting – where
everybody votes in this way – the Llull matrix takes the form vxy = fx
for any y 6= x, where fx is the fraction of the vote that chooses x.
Besides the scores vxy, in the sequel we will often deal with the mar-
gins mxy and the turnouts txy, which are defined respectively by
(8) mxy = vxy − vyx, txy = vxy + vyx.
Obviously, their dependence on the pair xy is respectively antisymmetric
and symmetric, that is
(9) myx = −mxy, tyx = txy.
It is clear also that the scores vxy and vyx can be recovered from mxy
and txy by means of the formulas
(10) vxy = (txy +mxy)/2, vyx = (txy −mxy)/2.
Instead of the margins mxy = vxy − vyx, sometimes, especially in
decision theory, one considers the ratios pxy = vxy/vyx (which requires
the preference scores to be all of them positive). Alternatively, one
can consider the relative scores qxy = vxy/txy (which only requires the
turnouts to be positive). Obviously, the matrix of relative preference
scores is always complete. The ratios and the relative scores are related
to each other by the formulas pxy = qxy/(1− qxy), qxy = pxy/(1 + pxy).
Notice however that in the incomplete case neither the margins, nor the
ratios, nor the relative scores, allow to recover the original scores, unless
one knows also the turnouts txy.
In order to refer to it as a whole, the Llull matrix made of the pref-
erence scores vxy will be denoted as (vxy), or alternatively as V. We
will also use the notation VRS to mean the restriction of (vxy) to x ∈ R
and y ∈ S, where R and S are arbitrary non-empty subsets of A. Simi-
larly, if (ux) is a collection of numbers indexed by x ∈ A, its restriction
to x ∈ R will be denoted as uR.
1.2. The simplest rating of the overall acceptance of an option x is
its mean preference score, that is, the arithmetic mean of its preference
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scores against all the other options:
(11) ρx =
1
N − 1
∑
y 6=x
vxy.
This quantity is linearly related to the rank-based count proposed in 1433
by Nikolaus von Kues [16, §1.4.3, §4] and again in 1770–1784 by Jean-
Charles de Borda [16, §1.5.2, §5] (both of them being restricted to the
complete case). More specifically, their count amounts to 1+(N−1)ρx =
(1−ρx)+ρxN . Instead of it, in [1, 2] we considered the mean ranks r¯x,
which are given by
(12) r¯x = N − (N − 1) ρx = ρx + (1− ρx)N.
Notice that, contrarily to ρx, lower mean ranks correspond to a higher
acceptance. The ratings Rx that were considered in [1, 2] are nothing
else than the mean ranks that are obtained after transforming the Llull
matrix by means of the CLC projection.
The mean preference scores ρx can certainly be rescaled to add up
to 1. More interestingly, in the case of single-choice voting they fulfil
the requirement of coinciding with the vote fractions fx. In fact, having
vxy = fx for any y 6= x certainly implies ρx = fx. However, they
definitely do not satisfy the condition of unanimous decomposition. For
instance, for A = {a, b, c} with vab = vac = vbc = 1 (which implies
vba = vca = vcb = 0) a is unanimously preferred to both b and c but
ρb = 1/2 > 0.
1.3. As we mentioned in the introduction, our goal will be achieved
by means of Zermelo’s method together with a prior application of the
CLC projection. In connection with Zermelo’s method, we need to in-
troduce a qualitative notion of priority that also bears relation to the
CLC projection. In order to define it, we will make use of the indirect
scores v∗xy: given x and y, one considers all possible paths x0x1 . . . xn
going from x0 = x to xn = y; every such path is associated with the
score of its weakest link, i. e. the smallest value of vxixi+1 ; finally, v
∗
xy is
defined as the maximum value of this associated score over all paths
from x to y. In other words,
(13) v∗xy = max
x0=x
xn=y
min
i≥0
i<n
vxixi+1 ,
where the max operator considers all possible paths from x to y, and the
min operator considers all the links of a particular path. For instance,
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the indirect scores for the Llull matrix (2) are as follows:
(14) (V ∗xy) =
a 10 12 12
8 b 15 15
8 8 c 16
8 8 8 d
.
By the definition of v∗xy, the inequality v
∗
xy > 0 clearly defines a
transitive relation. In the following we will denote it by the symbol D.
Thus,
(15) x D y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0.
Associated with it, it is interesting to consider also the following derived
relations, which keep the property of transitivity and are respectively
symmetric and asymmetric:
x ≡ y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0 and v∗yx > 0,(16)
x . y ⇐⇒ v∗xy > 0 and v∗yx = 0.(17)
Therefore, ≡ is an equivalence relation and . is a partial order. In the
following, the situation where x . y will be expressed by saying that x
dominates y.
The equivalence classes of A by ≡ are called the irreducible compo-
nents of A (for V). If there is only one of them, namely A itself, then
one says that the matrix V is irreducible. So, V is irreducible if and only
if v∗xy > 0 for any x, y ∈ A. It is not difficult to see that this property is
equivalent to the following one formulated in terms of the direct scores
only: there is no splitting of A into two classes X and Y so that vyx = 0
for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y ; in other words, there is no ordering of A for
which the matrix V takes the form
(18)
(
VXX VXY
O VYY
)
,
where VXX and VYY are square matrices and O is a zero matrix. Besides,
a subset X ⊆ A is an irreducible component if and only if X is maximal,
in the sense of set inclusion, for the property of VXX being irreducible.
On the other hand, it also happens that the relation . is compatible with
the equivalence relation ≡, i. e. if x ≡ x¯ and y ≡ y¯ then x . y implies
x¯ . y¯. As a consequence, the relation . can be applied also to the
irreducible components of A for V. In the following we will be interested
in the case where V is irreducible, or more generally, when there is a top
dominant irreducible component, i. e. an irreducible component which
dominates any other irreducible component.
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2. Zermelo’s method of strengths
The Llull matrix of a vote among V voters can be viewed as a tour-
nament between the members of A. In fact, it is as if x and y had played
Txy = txyV matches (the number of voters who made a comparison
between x and y, even if some of these voters considered x at the same
level as y) and Vxy = vxyV of these matches had been won by x, whereas
the other Vyx = vyxV had been won by y (one tied match is counted
as half a match in favour of x plus half a match in favour of y). It was
in such a scenario that Zermelo devised in 1929 his rating method [24].
Later on, the same method has been rediscovered by several other autors
(see [21, 10] and the references therein).
Zermelo’s method is based upon a probabilistic model for the outcome
of a match between two items x and y. This model assumes that such a
match is won by x with probability ϕx/(ϕx +ϕy) whereas it is won by y
with probability ϕy/(ϕx + ϕy), where ϕx is a non-negative parameter
associated with each player x, usually referred to as its strength. If all
matches are independent events, the probability of obtaining a particular
system of values for the scores (Vxy) is given by
(19) P =
∏
{x,y}
(
Txy
Vxy
)(
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
)Vxy ( ϕy
ϕx + ϕy
)Vyx
,
where the product runs through all unordered pairs {x, y}⊆A with x 6=y.
Notice that P depends only on the strength ratios; in other words, multi-
plying all the strengths by the same value has no effect on the result. On
account of this, we will normalize the strengths by requiring their sum to
be equal to 1. In order to include certain extreme cases, one must allow
for some of the strengths to vanish. However, this may conflict with P
being well defined, since it could lead to indeterminacies of the type 0/0
or 00. So, one should be careful in connection with vanishing strengths.
With all this in mind, for the moment we will let the strengths vary in
the following set:
(20) Q =
{
ϕ ∈ RA | ϕx > 0 for all x ∈ A,
∑
x∈A
ϕx = 1
}
.
Together with this set, in the following we will consider also its closure Q,
which includes vanishing strengths, and its boundary ∂Q = Q \ Q. As
it will be seen below, Zermelo’s method corresponds to a maximum like-
lihood estimate of the parameters ϕx from a given set of actual values
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of Vxy (and of Txy = Vxy +Vyx). In other words, given the values of Vxy,
one looks for the values of ϕx which maximize the probability P .
The hypothesis of independence which lies behind formula (19) is
certainly not satisfied by the binary comparisons which arise out of pref-
erential voting. However, it turns out that the same estimates of the
parameters ϕx arise from a related model where the voters are assumed
to express complete definite rankings (“definite” means here “without
ties”). Both Zermelo’s binary model and the ranking model that we
are about to introduce can be viewed as special cases of a more gen-
eral model, proposed in 1959 by Robert Duncan Luce, which considers
the outcome of making a choice out of multiple options [15]. Accord-
ing to Luce’s “choice axiom”, the probabilities of two different choices x
and y are in a ratio which does not depend on which other options are
present. As a consequence, it follows that every option x can be associ-
ated a number ϕx so that the probability of choosing x out of a set X
that contains x is given by ϕx/(
∑
y∈X ϕy). Obviously, Zermelo’s model
corresponds to considering binary choices only. However, Luce’s model
also allows to associate every complete definite ranking with a certain
probability. In fact, such a ranking can be viewed as the result of first
choosing the winner out of the whole set A, then choosing the best of
the remainder, and so on. If these successive choices are assumed to
be independent events, then one can easily figure out the corresponding
probability. Furthermore, one can see that these probabilities make the
expected rank of x equal to E(rx) = N−
∑
y 6=x ϕx/(ϕx+ϕy). By equat-
ing these values to the mean ranks given by equations (11) and (12),
namely r¯x = N −
∑
y 6=x vxy – so using the so-called method of moments
– one obtains exactly the same equations for the estimated values of the
parameters ϕx as in the method of maximum likelihood, namely equa-
tions (22) below. Notice also that, in accordance with Luce’s theory
of choice, the normalization condition
∑
x∈A ϕx = 1 allows to view ϕx
as the first-choice probability of x (among non-abstainers). Anyway, i.
e. independently of the reasons behind them, the resulting values of ϕx
will be seen to have good properties for our purposes.
In the following we take the point of view of maximum likelihood. So,
given the values of Vxy, we will look for the values of ϕx which maximize
the probability P . Since Vxy and Txy = Vxy + Vyx are now fixed, this is
equivalent to maximizing the following function of the ϕx:
(21) F (ϕ) =
∏
{x,y}
ϕx
vxy ϕy
vyx
(ϕx + ϕy)txy
,
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(recall that vxy = Vxy/V and txy = Txy/V , where V is a positive con-
stant greater than or equal to any of the turnouts Txy; going from (19)
to (21) involves taking the power of exponent 1/V and disregarding a
fixed multiplicative constant). The function F is certainly smooth on Q.
Besides, it is clearly bounded from above, since it is a product of several
factors less than or equal to 1. However, generally speaking F needs not
to achieve a maximum in Q, because this set is not compact. In the
present situation, the only general fact that one can guarantee in this
connection is the existence of maximizing sequences, i. e. sequences ϕn
in Q with the property that F (ϕn) converges to the lowest upper bound
F = sup{F (ψ) | ψ ∈ Q}.
The theorems of this section collect the basic results that we need
about Zermelo’s method. The first theorem is standard except for
part (c). However, we prove also parts (a) and (b) because in so do-
ing we introduce several ideas and techniques that are used in part (c)
and in other parts of the paper.
Theorem 2.1 (Zermelo, 1929 [24]; see also [8, 10]). If V is irreducible,
then:
(a) There is a unique ϕ ∈ Q which maximizes F on Q.
(b) ϕ is the solution of the following system of equations:∑
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
=
∑
y 6=x
vxy, for every x,(22)
∑
x
ϕx = 1.(23)
(c) ϕ is an infinitely differentiable function of the scores vxy as long
as they keep satisfying the hypothesis of irreducibility.
Proof: Let us begin by noticing that the hypothesis of irreducibility en-
tails that F can be extended to a continuous function on Q by putting
F (ψ) = 0 for ψ ∈ ∂Q. In order to prove this claim we must show
that F (ψn) → 0 whenever ψn converges to a point ψ ∈ ∂Q. Let us
consider the following sets associated with ψ: X = {x | ψx > 0} and
Y = {y | ψy = 0}. The second one is not empty since we are assuming
ψ ∈ ∂Q, whereas the first one is not empty because the strengths add up
to the positive value 1. Now, for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , F (ψn) contains a
factor of the form (ψny )
vyx , which tends to zero as soon as vyx > 0 (while
the other factors remain bounded). So, the only way for F (ψn) not to
approach zero would be VYX = O, in contradiction with the irreducibility
of V.
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After such an extension, F is a continuous function on the compact
set Q. So, there exists ϕ which maximizes F on Q. However, since F (ψ)
vanishes on ∂Q whereas it is strictly positive for ψ ∈ Q, any maximizer ϕ
must belong to Q. This establishes the existence part of (a).
Since F is constant on every ray from the origin, maximizing it on Q
amounts to the same thing as maximizing it on the positive orthant RA+.
On the other hand, maximizing F is certainly equivalent to maximizing
logF . Now, a maximizer of logF on RA+ must satisfy the differential
conditions
(24)
∂ logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx
=
∑
y 6=x
(
vxy
ϕx
− txy
ϕx + ϕy
)
= 0,
where x varies over A. Multiplying each of these equations by the cor-
responding ϕx results in the system of equations (22). That system
contains N equations for the N variables ϕx (x ∈ A); however, it is
redundant: by using the fact that vxy + vyx = txy, one easily sees that
adding up all of the equations in (22) results in a tautology. That is why
one can supplement that system with equation (23), which selects the
maximizer in Q.
Let us see now that the maximizer is unique. Instead of following the
interesting proof given by Zermelo, here we will prefer to follow [10],
which will have the advantage of preparing matters for part (c). More
specifically, the uniqueness will be obtained by seeing that any critical
point of logF as a function on Q, i. e. any solution of (22) and (23), is a
strict local maximum; this implies that there is only one critical point,
because otherwise one should have other kinds of critical points [6, §VI.6]
(we are invoking the so-called mountain pass theorem; here we are using
the fact that logF tends to −∞ as ϕ approaches ∂Q). In order to study
the character of a critical point we will look at the second derivatives of
logF with respect to ϕ. By differentiating (24), one obtains that
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕ2x
= −
∑
y 6=x
(
vxy
ϕ2x
− txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
)
,(25)
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx ∂ϕy
=
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
, for x 6= y.(26)
On the other hand, when ϕ is a critical point, (22) transforms (25) into
the following expression:
(27)
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕ2x
= −
∑
y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
ϕy
ϕx
.
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So, the Hessian quadratic form is as follows:∑
x,y
(
∂2 logF (ϕ)
∂ϕx ∂ϕy
)
ψx ψy = −
∑
x,y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2
(
ϕy
ϕx
ψ2x − ψxψy
)
= −
∑
x,y 6=x
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2ϕxϕy
(
ϕ2yψ
2
x − ϕxϕyψxψy
)
= −
∑
{x,y}
txy
(ϕx + ϕy)2ϕxϕy
(ϕyψx − ϕxψy)2 ,
(28)
where the last sum runs through all unordered pairs {x, y}⊆A with x 6=y.
The last expression is non-positive and it vanishes if and only if ψx/ϕx =
ψy/ϕy for any x, y ∈ A (the “only if” part is immediate when txy > 0;
for arbitrary x and y, the hypothesis of irreducibility allows to connect
them through a path x0x1 . . . xn (x0 = x, xn = y) with the property that
txixi+1 ≥ vxixi+1 > 0 for any i, so that one gets ψx/ϕx = ψx1/ϕx1 =
· · · = ψy/ϕy). So, the vanishing of (28) happens if and only if ψ = λϕ
for some scalar λ. However, when ψ is restricted to variations such
that ϕ + ψ stays in Q, i. e. to vectors ψ ∈ RA satisfying ∑x ψx = 0,
the case ψ = λϕ reduces to λ = 0 and therefore ψ = 0 (since
∑
x ϕx
is positive). So, the Hessian is negative definite when restricted to such
variations. This ensures that ϕ is a strict local maximum of logF as
a function on Q. In fact, one easily arrives at such a conclusion when
Taylor’s formula is used to analyse the behaviour of logF (ϕ + ψ) for
small ψ satisfying
∑
x ψx = 0.
Finally, let us consider part (c), that is, the dependence of ϕ ∈ Q
on the matrix V. To begin with, we notice that the set I of irreducible
matrices is open since it is a finite intersection of open sets, namely one
open set for each splitting of A into two sets X and Y . The depen-
dence of ϕ ∈ Q on V is due to the presence of vxy and txy = vxy + vyx
in equations (22) and (23) which determine ϕ. However, we are not
in the standard setting of the implicit function theorem, since we are
dealing with a system of N + 1 equations whilst ϕ varies in a space of
dimension N−1. In order to place oneself in a standard setting, it is con-
venient here to replace the condition of normalization
∑
x ϕx = 1 by the
alternative one ϕa = 1, where a is a fixed element of A. This change
of normalization corresponds to mapping Q to U = {ϕ ∈ RA | ϕx >
0 for all x ∈ A, ϕa = 1} by means of the diffeomorphism g : ϕ 7→ ϕ/ϕa,
which has the property that F (g(ϕ)) = F (ϕ). By an argument of the
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same kind as that used at the end of the preceding paragraph, one sees
that the Hessian bilinear form of logF is negative definite when restricted
to variations so as to stay in U . Therefore, if we take as coordinates on U
the ϕx with x ∈ A \ {a} =: A′, the function F restricted to U has the
property that the matrix (∂2 logF (ϕ)/∂ϕx∂ϕy | x, y ∈ A′) is negative
definite and therefore invertible, which entails that the system of equa-
tions (∂ logF (ϕ,V)/∂ϕx = 0 | x ∈ A′) – where we made explicit the
dependence on V – determines ϕ ∈ U as a smooth function of V ∈ I.
The next theorem is the core result for ensuring at the same time
both the condition of unanimous decomposition and the continuity of
the ratings with respect to the data. Let us recall that a maximizing
sequence means a sequence ϕn ∈ Q such that F (ϕn) approaches the
lowest upper bound of F on Q.
Theorem 2.2 (Statements (a) and (b) are contained in [24]). Assume
that there exists a top dominant irreducible component X. In this case:
(a) There is a unique ϕ ∈ Q such that any maximizing sequence con-
verges to ϕ.
(b) ϕA\X = 0, whereas ϕX has all components positive and coincides
with the solution of a system analogous to (22) and (23) where x
and y vary only within X.
(c) ϕ is a continuous function of the scores vxy as long as they keep
satisfying the hypotheses of the present theorem.
Remark. The below given proof of statements (a) and (b) follows [24,
p. 440–442]. Again, we include it because it prepares the path for the
proof of (c). Partial results related to (c) are contained in [5, Thm. 1.1].
However, they consider only a special way of varying the scores vxy,
namely adding a common ε ↓ 0 to all the scores. Besides, their proof uses
some tools from algebraic geometry, whereas ours stays in the domain
of calculus.
Proof: The definition of the lowest upper bound immediately implies the
existence of maximizing sequences. On the other hand, the compactness
of Q guarantees that any maximizing sequence has a subsequence which
converges in Q. Let ϕn and ϕ denote respectively one of such convergent
maximizing sequences and its limit. In the following we will see that ϕ
must be the unique point specified in statement (b). This entails that
any maximizing sequence converges itself to ϕ (without extracting a
subsequence).
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So, our aim is now statement (b). From now on we will write Y =
A \ X, and a general element of RA+ will be denoted by ψ. For conve-
nience, in this part of the proof we will replace the condition
∑
x ψx = 1
by
∑
x ψx ≤ 1 (and similarly for ϕn and ϕ); since F (λψ) = F (ψ) for
any λ > 0, the properties that we will obtain will be easily translated
from Q̂ = {ψ ∈ RA | ψx > 0 for all x ∈ A,
∑
x∈A ψx ≤ 1} to Q. On
the other hand, it will also be convenient to consider first the case where
Y is also an irreducible component. In such a case, it is interesting to
rewrite F (ψ) as a product of three factors:
(29) F (ψ) = FXX(ψX)FYY (ψY )FXY (ψX , ψY ),
namely:
FXX(ψX) =
∏
{x,x¯}⊆X
ψx
vxx¯ψx¯
vx¯x
(ψx + ψx¯)txx¯
,(30)
FYY (ψY ) =
∏
{y,y¯}⊆Y
ψy
vyy¯ψy¯
vy¯y
(ψy + ψy¯)tyy¯
,(31)
FXY (ψX , ψY ) =
∏
x∈X
y∈Y
(
ψx
ψx + ψy
)vxy
,(32)
where we used that vyx = 0 and txy = vxy. Now, let us look at the effect
of replacing ψY by λψY without varying ψX . The values of FXX and FYY
remain unchanged, but that of FXY varies in the following way:
(33)
FXY (ψX , λψY )
FXY (ψX , ψY )
=
∏
x∈X
y∈Y
(
ψx + ψy
ψx + λψy
)vxy
.
In particular, for 0 < λ < 1 each of the factors of the right-hand side
of (33) is greater than or equal to 1. This remark leads to the following
argument. First, we can see that ϕny/ϕ
n
x → 0 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y
such that vxy > 0 (such pairs xy exist because of the hypothesis that X
dominates Y ). Otherwise, the preceding remark entails that the sequence
ϕ˜n = (ϕnX , λϕ
n
Y ) with 0 < λ < 1 would satisfy F (ϕ˜
n) > KF (ϕn) for
some K > 1 and infinitely many n, in contradiction with the hypothesis
that ϕn was a maximizing sequence. On the other hand, we see also that
FXY (ϕ
n) approaches its lowest upper bound, namely 1. Having achieved
such a property, the problem of maximizing F reduces to separately
maximizing FXX and FYY , which is solved by Theorem 2.1. For the
moment we are dealing with relative strengths only, i. e. without any
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normalizing condition like (23). So, we see that FYY gets optimized
when each of the ratios ϕny/ϕ
n
y¯ (y, y¯ ∈ Y ) approaches the homologous
one for the unique maximizer of FYY , and analogously with FXX . Since
these ratios are finite positive quantities, the statement that ϕny/ϕ
n
x → 0
becomes extended to any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y whatsoever (since one can
write ϕny/ϕ
n
x = (ϕ
n
y/ϕ
n
y¯ ) × (ϕny¯/ϕnx¯) × (ϕnx¯/ϕnx) with vx¯y¯ > 0). Let us
recover now the condition
∑
x∈A ϕ
n
x = 1. The preceding facts imply that
ϕnY → 0, whereas ϕnX converges to the unique maximizer of FXX . This
establishes (b) as well as the uniqueness part of (a).
The general case where Y decomposes into several irreducible com-
ponents, all of them dominated by X, can be taken care of by induction
over the different irreducible components of A. At each step, one deals
with an irreducible component Z with the property of being minimal,
in the sense of the dominance relation . , among those which are still
pending. By means of an argument analogous to that of the preceding
paragraph, one sees that: (i) ϕnz /ϕ
n
x → 0 for any z ∈ Z and x such that
x . z with vxz > 0; (ii) the ratios ϕnz /ϕ
n
z¯ (z, z¯ ∈ Z) approach the homol-
ogous ones for the unique maximizer of FZZ ; and (iii) ϕ
n
R is a maximizing
sequence for FRR, where R denotes the union of the pending components,
Z excluded. Once this induction process has been completed, one can
combine its partial results to show that ϕnz /ϕ
n
x → 0 for any x ∈ X and
z 6∈ X (it suffices to consider a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 ∈ X to xn = z
with the property that vxixi+1 > 0 for any i and to notice that each of
the factors ϕnxi+1/ϕ
n
xi remains bounded while at least one of them tends
to zero). As above, one concludes that ϕnA\X → 0, whereas ϕnX converges
to the unique maximizer of FXX .
The two following remarks will be useful in the proof of part (c):
(A) According to the proof above, ϕX is determined (up to a multiplica-
tive constant) by equations (22) with x and y varying only within X:
(34) Gx(ϕX ,V) :=
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
vxy = 0, ∀x ∈ X.
However, since y ∈ A \ X implies on the one hand ϕy = 0 and on the
other hand txy = vxy, each of the preceding equations is equivalent to a
similar one where y varies over the whole of A \ {x}:
(35) Ĝx(ϕ,V) :=
∑
y∈A
y 6=x
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
y∈A
y 6=x
vxy = 0, ∀x ∈ X.
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(B) Also, it is interesting to see the result of adding up equations (35)
for all x in some subset W of X. Using the fact that vxy + vyx = txy,
one sees that such an addition results in the following equality:
(36)
∑
x∈W
y 6∈W
txy
ϕx
ϕx + ϕy
−
∑
x∈W
y 6∈W
vxy = 0, ∀W ⊆ X.
Let us proceed now with the proof of (c). In the following, V and V˜ de-
note respectively a fixed matrix satisfying the hypotheses of the theorem
and a slight perturbation of it. In the following we systematically use a
tilde to distinguish between homologous objects associated respectively
with V and V˜; in particular, such a notation will be used in connec-
tion with the labels of certain equations. Our aim is to show that ϕ˜
approaches ϕ as V˜ approaches V. In this connection we will use the
little-o and big-O notations made popular by Edmund Landau (who, by
the way, wrote also on the rating of chess players [12, 13], as we will
see in Subsection 5.1). This notation refers here to functions of V˜ and
their behaviour as V˜ approaches V; if f and g are two such functions,
f = o(g) means that for every  > 0 there exists a δ > 0 such that
‖V˜ − V‖ ≤ δ implies ‖f(V˜)‖ ≤ ‖g(V˜)‖; on the other hand, f = O(g)
means that there exist M and δ > 0 such that ‖V˜ − V‖ ≤ δ implies
‖f(V˜)‖ ≤M‖g(V˜)‖.
Obviously, if V˜ is near enough to V then vxy > 0 implies v˜xy > 0.
As a consequence, x D y implies x D˜ y. In particular, the irreducibility
of VXX entails that V˜XX is also irreducible. Therefore, X is entirely
contained in some irreducible component X˜ of A for V˜. Besides, X˜ is a
top dominant irreducible component for V˜; in fact, we have the following
chain of implications for x ∈ X ⊆ X˜: y 6∈ X˜ ⇒ y 6∈ X ⇒ x . y ⇒
x D˜ y ⇒ x .˜ y, where we have used successively: the inclusion
X ⊆ X˜, the hypothesis that X is top dominant for V, the fact that V˜
is near enough to V, and the hypothesis that y does not belong to the
irreducible component X˜. Now, according to part (b) of the theorem
and remark (A) from p. 114, ϕX and ϕ˜X˜ are determined respectively
by systems (34) and (3˜4), or equivalently by (35) and (3˜5), whereas
ϕA\X and ϕ˜A\X˜ are both of them equal to zero. So we must show that
ϕ˜y = o(1) for any y ∈ X˜ \X, and that ϕ˜x − ϕx = o(1) for any x ∈ X.
The proof is organized in three main steps.
Step (1). ϕ˜y = O(ϕ˜x) whenever vxy > 0. For the moment, we assume
V˜ fixed (near enough to V so that v˜xy > 0) and x, y ∈ X˜. Under
these hypotheses one can argue as follows: Since ϕ˜X˜ maximizes F˜X˜X˜ , the
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corresponding value of F˜X˜X˜ can be bounded from below by any particular
value of the same function. On the other hand, we can bound it from
above by the factor (ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y))
v˜xy . So, we can write
(37)
(
1
2
)N(N−1)
2
≤
(
1
2
) ∑
{p,q}⊆X˜
t˜pq
= F˜X˜X˜(ψ)≤ F˜X˜X˜(ϕ˜X˜)≤
(
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x+ ϕ˜y
)˜vxy
,
where ψ has been taken so that ψq has the same value for all q ∈ X˜.
The preceding inequality entails that
(38) ϕ˜y ≤
(
2N(N−1)/v˜xy − 1
)
ϕ˜x.
Now, this inequality holds not only for x, y ∈ X˜, but it is also trivially
true for y 6∈ X˜, since then one has ϕ˜y = 0. On the other hand, the
case y ∈ X˜, x 6∈ X˜ is not possible at all, because the hypothesis that
v˜xy > 0 would then contradict the fact that X˜ is a top dominant irre-
ducible component. Finally, we let V˜ vary towards V. The desired result
is a consequence of (38) since v˜xy approaches vxy > 0.
Step (2). ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x) for any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X. Again, we will consider
first the special case where vxy > 0. In this case the result is easily
obtained as a consequence of the equality (3˜6) for W = X:
(39)
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
v˜xy = 0.
In fact, this equality implies that
(40)
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
t˜xy
(
1− ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
)
=
∑
x∈X
y 6∈X
v˜yx.
Now, it is clear that the right-hand side of this equation is o(1) and
that each of the terms of the left-hand side is positive or zero. Since
t˜xy − vxy = t˜xy − txy = o(1), the hypothesis that vxy > 0 allows to
conclude that ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y) approaches 1, or equivalently, ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x).
Let us consider now the case of any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X. Since X is top
dominant, we know that there exists a path x0x1 . . . xn from x0 = x
to xn = y such that vxixi+1 > 0 for all i. According to step (1) we have
ϕ˜xi+1 = O(ϕ˜xi). On the other hand, there must be some j such that
xj ∈ X but xj+1 6∈ X, which has been seen to imply that ϕ˜xj+1 = o(ϕ˜xj ).
By combining these facts one obtains the desired result.
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Step (3). ϕ˜x − ϕx = o(1) for any x ∈ X. Consider equations (3˜5) for
x ∈ X and split the sums in two parts depending on whether y ∈ X or
y 6∈ X:
(41)
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
v˜xy =
∑
y 6∈X
(
v˜xy − t˜xy ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
)
.
The last sum is o(1) since step (2) ensures that ϕ˜y = o(ϕ˜x) and we also
know that t˜xy − v˜xy = v˜yx = o(1) (because x ∈ X and y 6∈ X). So ϕ˜
satisfies a system of the following form, where x and y vary only within X
and w˜xy is a slight modification of v˜xy which absorbs the right-hand side
of (41):
(42) Hx(ϕ˜X , V˜, W˜) :=
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
t˜xy
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕ˜y
−
∑
y∈X
y 6=x
w˜xy = 0, ∀x ∈ X.
Here, the second argument of H refers to the dependence on V˜
through t˜xy. We know that t˜xy−txy = o(1) and also that w˜xy − vxy =
(w˜xy−v˜xy)+(v˜xy−vxy)=o(1). So we are interested in the preceding equa-
tion near the point (ϕX ,V,V). Now, in this point we have H(ϕX ,V,V)=
G(ϕX ,V) = 0, as well as (∂Hx/∂ϕ˜y)(ϕX ,V,V) = (∂Gx/∂ϕy)(ϕX ,V).
Therefore, the implicit function theorem can be applied similarly as in
Theorem 2.1, with the result that ϕ˜X = S(V˜, W˜), where S is a smooth
function that satisfies S(V,V) = ϕX . In particular, the continuity of S
allows to conclude that ϕ˜X approaches ϕX , since we know that both V˜
and W˜ approach V.
Finally, by combining the results of steps (2) and (3) one obtains
ϕ˜y = o(1) for any y 6∈ X.
Remarks.
1. Part (a) states that every maximizing sequence converges towards
a particular φ in Q. The converse statement is false: converging towards
this φ is not a sufficient condition for being a maximizing sequence. The
preceding proof shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for ϕn
to be a maximizing sequence is that the ratios ϕnz /ϕ
n
y tend to 0 when-
ever y . z, whereas, for y ≡ z, i. e. if y and z belong to the same
irreducible component Z, they approach the homologous ratios for the
unique maximizer of FZZ .
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2. If there is not a dominant component, then the maximizing se-
quences can have multiple limit points.
3. The non-linear system (22) and (23) can be solved by the following
iterative scheme [24, 8]:
∑
y 6=x
txy
ϕ
(n+1)
x
ϕ
(n)
x + ϕ
(n)
y
=
∑
y 6=x
vxy,(43)
∑
x
ϕ(n+1)x = 1 .(44)
3. CLC structure
This section is devoted to paired-comparison matrices with a certain
special structure, namely the structure that arises from the CLC pro-
jection that we introduced in [1, 2]. As we will see, these matrices
have good properties in connection with Zermelo’s method and with the
dominance relation that was defined in Subsection 1.3.
3.1. A paired-comparison matrix will be said to have CLC structure,
or to be a CLC matrix, when there exists a total order ξ on A such that
vxy ≥ vyx, whenever x ξ y,(45)
vxz = max(vxy, vyz), whenever x ξ y ξ z,(46)
vzx = min(vzy, vyx), whenever x ξ y ξ z,(47)
0 ≤ txz − tx′z ≤ mxx′ , whenever z 6∈ {x, x′},(48)
where x ξ y means that x precedes y in the order ξ, and x′ denotes
the element of A that immediately follows x in the order ξ. In such
a situation the total order ξ will be called an admissible order for the
matrix (vxy).
Our interest in the CLC structure derives from the following fact:
Theorem 3.1 ([2, Thm. 4.5]). The CLC projection always results in a
CLC matrix. Besides, a CLC matrix is invariant by the CLC projection.
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For instance, in the case of the Llull matrix (2) the CLC projection
results in the following CLC matrix:
(49) (V pixy) =
a 10 11 11
8 b 11 11
7 7 c 11
7 7 7 d
.
Most of this paper – the only exceptions are the proofs of Proposition 4.3
and Theorem 4.6 – does not depend on the details of the CLC projection
procedure, which are given in [1, 2].
In the following we will also make use of the following facts:
Lemma 3.2. A CLC matrix satisfies the following inequalities:
vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y},(50)
txz ≥ tyz, tzx ≥ tzy, whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}.(51)
Proof: Let us begin by noticing that it suffices to prove the following
particular inequalities:
vzx ≤ vzy, whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y},(52)
txz ≥ tyz, whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}.(53)
In fact, (53) contains both inequalities of (51) since tαβ = tβα, and the
first inequality of (50) follows from (52) and (53) since tαβ = vαβ + vβα.
In order to prove (52) and (53) we will distinguish three cases: (i) x ξ
y ξ z; (ii) z ξ x ξ y; (iii) x ξ z ξ y.
Case (i): x ξ y ξ z. In this case, inequality (52) derives from (47).
On the other hand, (53) follows by an iterated application of the first
inequality of (48): txz ≥ tx′z ≥ · · · ≥ tyz.
Case (ii): z ξ x ξ y. This case is analogous to the preceding one, with
the only difference that it relies on (46) instead of (47).
Case (iii): x ξ z ξ y. In order to deal with this case, we will start by
the special subcase where x, z, y are consecutive in the order ξ, i. e. we
will start by the inequalities
vx′x ≤ vx′x′′ ,(54)
txx′ ≥ tx′′x′ .(55)
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These inequalities are obtained by adding up two particular cases of (48),
namely the one where z is replaced by x′′ and the one where x and z are
replaced respectively by x′ and x. In fact, this addition results in
(56) 0 ≤ txx′ − tx′x′′ ≤ mx′x′′ +mxx′ ,
whose two inequalities give respectively (55) and (54). Finally, the gen-
eral situation x ξ z ξ y can be dealt with by combining (55) and (54)
with the results of cases (i) and (ii). In fact, if a denotes the immediate
predecessor of z in the order ξ, we can write
vzx ≤ vza ≤ vzz′ ≤ vzy,
txz ≥ taz ≥ tz′z ≥ tyz.
Proposition 3.3. A non-vanishing CLC matrix has a top dominant
irreducible component X with the special property that
(57) vxy > 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6= x.
Proof: If vxy > 0 for all x, y, then (vxy) is irreducible and we are done.
So, let us assume that vxy = 0 for some x, y. By (45) and (47), this im-
plies the existence of some p such that vp′p = 0. Here we are considering
an arbitrary admissible order ξ, which we fix for the rest of the proof.
Let a be the first element of A according to this order. We will see that
the top dominant component is the set X defined by
X =
{
{x ∈ A | vp′p > 0 for all p ξ x}, if vp′p > 0 for some p,
{a}, if vp′p = 0 for any p.
From this definition it immediately follows that having x ∈ X and y 6∈ X
implies x ξ y. This fact will be used repeatedly in the following.
From the definition, it is also clear that for any x ∈ X and y 6∈ X
there exists p with x −
ξ p ξ y such that vp′p = 0. By virtue of (47), it
follows that
(58) vyx = 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6∈ X.
The claim that X is the top dominant component will be a consequence
of the preceding property together with (57), to which we devote the
rest of the proof.
Let us begin by seeing that vaa′ > 0. In fact, according to (45)
having vaa′ = 0 would imply va′a = 0 and therefore taa′ = 0; by (51),
this would imply the vanishing of the whole matrix (vxy), against one
of the assumptions. Now, by virtue of (50) it follows that vay > 0 for
all y 6= a. This finishes the proof if X consists of a only. In the other
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cases, observe first that the definition of X combined with (45) and (47)
ensures vxx¯ > 0 for all x, x¯ ∈ X. Finally, (50) allows to derive that
vxy > 0 for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X, which completes the proof.
Lemma 3.4. A non-vanishing CLC matrix has the following proper-
ties, where ξ is any admissible order, ρx are the mean preference scores,
and X is the top dominant component:
(a) x ξ y implies ρx ≥ ρy.
(b) ρx > ρy implies inequalities (45) and (50).
(c) ρx = ρy implies that (45) and (50) hold with equality signs.
(d) ρx = ρy if and only if vxy = vyx.
(e) ρx > ρy if and only if vxy > vyx.
(f) ρx > ρy whenever x ∈ X and y 6∈ X.
Proof: Let us recall that the mean preference scores ρx are defined by
equation (11). From that equation it follows that
(59) (N − 1)(ρx − ρy) = (vxy − vyx) +
∑
z 6=x,y
(vxz − vyz).
In the sequel we will use also the fact that, according to the definition
of CLC matrix and Lemma 3.2,
x ξ y =⇒ inequalities (45) and (50), namely:(60)
vxy ≥ vyx, vxz ≥ vyz, vzx ≤ vzy, for any z 6∈ {x, y}.
Statement (a) is an immediate consequence of combining (59) and (60).
Since ξ is a total order, the contrapositive of (a) amounts to say that
ρx > ρy implies x ξ y. Combining this implication with (60) gives (b).
Let us now assume ρx = ρy as in (c); since ξ is a total order, we can
also assume without loss of generality that x ξ y; according to (60), this
ensures that all the terms of the right-hand side of (59) are positive or
zero; since the left-hand side vanishes, we arrive at the conclusion that
every term of the right-hand side must vanish; so, we get vxy = vyx as
well as vxz = vyz for any z 6∈ {x, y}. In order to complete the proof
of (c) it remains to prove that we have also vzx = vzy for any z 6∈ {x, y}.
This will be a consequence of the fact that we will prove next.
In fact, we claim that
(61) vxy = vyx =⇒ vxz = vyz, vzx = vzy, for any z 6∈ {x, y}.
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In order to prove this implication we will distinguish three cases:
Case (i): x ξ y ξ z. In this case it suffices to notice that
vxz = max(vxy, vyz) = max(vyx, vyz) = vyz,
vyz = min(vyx, vxz) = min(vxy, vxz) = vxz,
where we are using successively from left to right: (46) and (47), the
assumed equality vxy = vyx, and (60) with y replaced by z.
Case (ii): z ξ x ξ y. This case is analogous to the preceding one, with
the difference that vxz = vyz relies on (47) and vzx = vzy relies on (46).
Case (iii): x ξ z ξ y. In this case, (60) allows to write the following
inequalities:
vxy ≥ vxz ≥ vyz ≥ vyx,
vyx ≤ vzx ≤ vzy ≤ vxy.
When vxy = vyx all of them become equalities, which gives the desired
result. This completes the proof of (61).
The if part of statement (d) relies also on (61). If vxy = vyx, then
we have vxz = vyz for any z 6∈ {x, y}, which results in ρx = ρy because
of (59). The only-if part of (d) is contained in (c). Concerning state-
ment (e), the implication ρx > ρy ⇒ vxy > vyx follows easily from (b)
together with (d), whereas the implication ρx ≥ ρy ⇒ vxy ≥ vyx is con-
tained in (b) together with (c). Finally, in order to obtain (f) it suffices
to combine (e) with Proposition 3.3.
3.2. In this paragraph we look at the compatibility between strengths
and mean preference scores.
In this connection, Zermelo proved that in the complete (and irre-
ducible) case the strengths always order the options in exactly the same
way as the mean preference scores [24, §4].
This compatibility easily disappears in the general incomplete case.
However, it remains true for CLC matrices:
Theorem 3.5. For a CLC matrix, the associated mean preference
scores ρx and strengths ϕx have the following compatibility properties:
(a) ϕx > ϕy ⇒ ρx > ρy.
(b) ρx > ρy ⇒ either ϕx > ϕy or ϕx = ϕy = 0.
Proof: In the following X denotes again the top dominant component
of the Llull matrix, whose existence has been established by Proposi-
tion 3.3. By Theorem 2.2, we know that ϕx > 0 if and only if x ∈ X.
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Let us begin by noticing that both statements of the present theorem
hold if ϕy = 0, that is, if y 6∈ X. In this case statement (b) is triv-
ial, while statement (a) holds because of Lemma 3.4(f). Consider now
the case ϕx = 0. In this case statement (a) is empty, whereas state-
ment (b) reduces, via its contrapositive, to Lemma 3.4(f) (with x and y
interchanged with each other).
So, from now on, we can assume that x and y are both in X. In the
following we will make use of the results of Section 2, according to which
the strengths ϕX are determined by the condition of maximizing the
function (21) under restriction (23), and that they satisfy equations (22).
All of this refers only to the block VXX of the Llull matrix V. This
contrasts with the computation of ρ, which uses the whole of V. However,
Lemma 3.4 will allow us to relate both kinds of information.
Part (a). It will be proved by seeing that a simultaneous occurrence of
the inequalities ϕx > ϕy and ρx ≤ ρy would entail a contradiction with
the fact that ϕ is the unique maximizer of F (ϕ). More specifically, we
will see that one would have F (ϕ˜) ≥ F (ϕ) where ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ
by interchanging the values of ϕx and ϕy, that is
(62) ϕ˜z =

ϕy, if z = x,
ϕx, if z = y,
ϕz, otherwise.
In fact, ϕ˜ differs from ϕ only in the components associated with x and y,
so that
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
=
(
ϕ˜x
ϕx
)vxy ∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕ˜x/(ϕ˜x + ϕz)
ϕx/(ϕx + ϕz)
)vxz (ϕx + ϕz
ϕ˜x + ϕz
)vzx
×
(
ϕ˜y
ϕy
)vyx ∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕ˜y/(ϕ˜y + ϕz)
ϕy/(ϕy + ϕz)
)vyz (ϕy + ϕz
ϕ˜y + ϕz
)vzy
.
(63)
More particularly, in the case of (62) this expression becomes
(64)
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
=
(
ϕy
ϕx
)vxy−vyx∏
z 6=x,y
(
ϕy/(ϕy+ϕz)
ϕx/(ϕx+ϕz)
)vxz−vyz(ϕy+ϕz
ϕx+ϕz
)vzy−vzx
,
where all of the bases are strictly less than 1, since ϕx > ϕy, and all of
the the exponents are non-positive, because of Lemma 3.4(b) and (c).
Therefore, the product is greater than or equal to 1, as claimed.
Part (b). Since we are assuming x, y ∈ X, it is a matter of proving that
ρx > ρy ⇒ ϕx > ϕy. By the contrapositive of (a), we already know that
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ρx ≥ ρy ⇒ ϕx ≥ ϕy. So it only remains to prove that a simultaneous
occurrence of the equality ϕx = ϕy =: ω together with the inequal-
ity ρx > ρy (by symmetry it suffices to consider this one) would entail
a contradiction with the fact that ϕ is the unique maximizer of F (ϕ).
More specifically, here we will see that one would have F (ϕ˜) > F (ϕ)
where ϕ˜ is obtained from ϕ by slightly increasing ϕx while decreasing
ϕy, that is
(65) ϕ˜z =

ω + , if z = x,
ω − , if z = y,
ϕz, otherwise.
This claim will be proved by checking that
(66)
d
d
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
∣∣∣∣
=0
> 0.
In fact, (63) entails that
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
= C + vxy log ϕ˜x + vyx log ϕ˜y
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(
vxz log
ϕ˜x
ϕ˜x + ϕz
+ vyz log
ϕ˜y
ϕ˜y + ϕz
)
−
∑
z 6=x,y
(
vzy log(ϕ˜y + ϕz) + vzx log(ϕ˜x + ϕz)
)
,
(67)
where C does not depend on . Therefore, in view of (65) we get
d
d
log
F (ϕ˜)
F (ϕ)
∣∣∣∣
=0
= (vxy − vyx) 1
ω
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(vxz − vyz) ϕz
ω(ω + ϕz)
+
∑
z 6=x,y
(vzy − vzx) 1
ω + ϕz
.
(68)
Now, according to parts (b) and (e) of Lemma 3.4, the assumption that
ρx > ρy implies the inequalities vxy > vyx, vxz ≥ vyz, and vzy ≥ vzx,
which result indeed in (66).
3.3. It is interesting to notice that a CLC matrix keeps an important
part of this structure when passing to the relative scores qxy = vxy/txy:
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Proposition 3.6. Assume that (vxy) is a CLC matrix. If one has txy >
0 for all x, y, then the relative scores qxy = vxy/txy have the following
properties, where ξ is any admissible order for (vxy):
qxy ≥ qyx, whenever x ξ y,(69)
qxz ≥ qyz, qzx ≤ qzy, whenever x ξ y and z 6∈ {x, y}.(70)
Besides, the top dominant irreducible component X of (vxy) is also top
dominant irreducible for (qxy), with the special property that
(71) qxy > 0, whenever x ∈ X and y 6= x.
If one has txy = 0 for some x, y, then there exists Y ⊆ A such that
txx¯ > 0, whenever x, x¯ 6∈ Y ,(72)
vyx = 0, whenever y ∈ Y and x 6= y.(73)
Proof: Consider first the case where txy > 0 for all x, y. Clearly, (45)
immediately implies (69). On the other hand, (50) implies (70) because
of the following chains of implications:
vxz
txz
≥ vyz
tyz
⇐⇒ txz
vxz
≤ tyz
vyz
⇐⇒ 1 + vzx
vxz
≤ 1 + vzy
vyz
,(74)
vzx
tzx
≤ vzy
tzy
⇐⇒ tzx
vzx
≥ tzy
vzy
⇐⇒ 1 + vxz
vzx
≥ 1 + vyz
vzy
.(75)
The statement about the top dominant irreducible component is also an
immediate consequence of the positivity of the turnouts.
If txy = 0 for some x, y, then (51) allow to derive that tpp′ = 0
for some p. If p1 is the first element with this property and we set
Y = {y ∈ A | p1 −
ξ y}, we immediately obtain (72), and (50) together
with (46) are easily seen to lead to (73).
As a consequence, we can see that the mean relative preference scores
(76) σx =
1
N − 1
∑
y 6=x
vxy/txy
rank the items in the same way as the original mean preference scores:
Corollary 3.7. Assume that (vxy) is a CLC matrix with positive turn-
outs. In that case, one has σx > σy if and only if ρx > ρy.
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Proof: In order to prove the stated equivalence, it suffices to prove the
two following implications:
ρx ≥ ρy =⇒ σx ≥ σy,(77)
ρx > ρy =⇒ σx > σy.(78)
Implication (77) is easily obtained by combining parts (b) and (c) of
Lemma 3.4 with the chain of implications (74). In order to prove (78)
it suffices to notice that, according to part (e) of Lemma 3.4, ρx > ρy
implies vxy > vyx and therefore vxy/txy > vyx/tyx.
Remark. If txy = 0 for some x, y, the last statement of Proposition 3.6
justifies considering any y ∈ Y categorically worse than any x 6∈ Y , and
restricting the rating to the subset X = A\Y , which brings the problem
to the case of positive turnouts.
4. The CLC projection followed by
Zermelo’s method of strengths
In this section we consider the rating method that is obtained by com-
posing the CLC projection of [1, 2] and Zermelo’s method of strengths.
That is, we consider the mapping Φ=ZP , where P denotes the CLC pro-
jection mapping (vxy) 7→ (vpixy) and Z denotes the mapping defined by
the method of strengths. As we will see, the properties of Z obtained
in the present article (Section 2) combine with those of P (Section 3)
to ensure that the resulting rating method enjoys the properties that we
claimed in the introduction.
We will use the following notations: (vxy) denotes the original Llull
matrix, (vpixy) denotes the projected one, and (ϕx) denotes the final
strengths. We will refer to the latter as the CLC-Zermelo fractions.
The next result establishes the property of single-choice voting con-
sistency.
Theorem 4.1. When each ballot confines to choosing a single option,
the CLC-Zermelo fractions coincide with the respective vote fractions.
Proof: As it was mentioned in Subsection 1.1, in the case of single-
choice voting one has vxy = fx, and therefore txy = fx + fy, for every
y 6= x. Such matrices have CLC structure, so they are invariant by
the CLC projection: vpixy = vxy = fx. By plugging these values in (22)
and (23), one easily sees that these equations are satisfied by taking
ϕx = fx.
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Let us consider now the property of unanimous decomposition. This
property is concerned with unanimously preferred sets, i. e. subsets X
of options with the property that each member of X is unanimously
preferred to any alternative from outside X.
Theorem 4.2. (a) The CLC-Zermelo fractions vanish outside of any
unanimously preferred set.
(b) In the complete case, the options that get non-vanishing CLC-Zer-
melo fractions form the minimal unanimously preferred set.
Proof: The proof hinges on comparing the set under consideration
with the top dominant irreducible component of the projected Llull ma-
trix (vpixy), whose existence is guaranteed by Proposition 3.3. In the
following, this top dominant irreducible component is denoted by X̂.
Part (a). Let X be an unanimously preferred set. By [2, Lem. 7.1], the
hypothesis that vxy = 1 for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X implies vpixy = 1, and
therefore vpiyx = 0, for all such pairs. This entails that X̂ ⊆ X, which
leads to the claimed conclusion since Theorem 2.2 ensures that ϕy = 0
for any y 6∈ X̂.
Part (b). By Theorem 2.2(b), X̂, the top dominant component for (vpixy),
is the set of options with non-vanishing CLC-Zermelo fractions.
We have vpiyx=0 for all x∈X̂ and y /∈X̂. Because of the completeness
assumption, this implies that vpixy = 1 and, by [2, Lem. 7.1], vxy = 1 for
all those pairs. So X̂ is an unanimously preferred set.
Finally, let us see that X̂ is minimal for this property. If we had
X ⊂ X̂ satisfying vxy = 1 for all x ∈X and y /∈ X, then [1, Lem. 9.1]
would give vpixy = 1 and therefore v
pi
yx = 0 for all such pairs, so X̂ could
not be the top dominant irreducible component of the matrix (vpixy).
Still in connection with the property of unanimous decomposition, the
following proposition includes a special case of incompleteness that has
practical interest. Notice that, in the incomplete case, the Llull matrix
not being irreducible, as in (18), does not entail the existence of a proper
unanimously preferred set.
Proposition 4.3. Assume that the individual votes are complete, or al-
ternatively, that each of them is a ranking (possibly truncated or with
ties). If X is a proper subset of options and it is the minimal unan-
imously preferred set, then the CLC-Zermelo fractions of X are all of
them positive and they coincide with those that one obtains when the
individual votes are restricted to X.
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Proof: Let us begin by noticing that the CLC structure of the projected
Llull matrix ensures that tpixy=1 for all x, y∈X. In fact, inequalities (51)
allow to derive it from the known fact – obtained in the proof of part (a)
of the preceding theorem – that tpixy = 1 for all x ∈ X and y 6∈ X.
Now we claim that under the present hypotheses, i. e. either com-
pleteness or ranking character of the individual votes, one has X̂ = X,
where X̂ denotes the top dominant irreducible component of the ma-
trix (vpixy). In fact, a strict inclusion X̂ ⊂ X would mean that vpixxˆ = 0
for any x ∈ X \ X̂ and xˆ ∈ X̂. By the remark of the preceding para-
graph, this implies that vpixˆx = 1 for all such pairs. Since we also have
vpixy = 1 for x ∈ X and y 6∈ X, we can conclude that vpixˆyˆ = 1 for all
xˆ ∈ X̂ and yˆ 6∈ X̂. Now, according to [1, Lem. 9.1] (for the complete
case) and [2, Lem. 7.1] (for the case of rankings, which are certainly
transitive), this implies that vxˆyˆ = 1 for all such pairs. This contradicts
the supposed minimality of X.
So, X itself is the top dominant irreducible component of the ma-
trix (vpixy). By making use of Theorem 2.2, it follows that ϕx > 0 for
all x ∈ X and that they are the strengths determined by the restriction
of the projected Llull matrix (vpixy) to the set X. In order to complete
the proof, we must show that this restriction of the projected Llull ma-
trix coincides with the projection of the same restriction applied to the
original Llull matrix (vxy), i. e. v
pi
xx¯ = v˜
pi
xx¯ for any x, x¯ ∈ X, where we
are using a tilde to denote the objects associated with the matrix ob-
tained by first restricting and then projecting. In order to establish this
equality, it suffices to obtain analogous equalities for the corresponding
margins and turnouts. Besides, by taking into account the way that the
CLC projection is defined, it suffices to obtain these equalities for x¯ = x′,
namely the option that immediately follows x in an admissible order ξ
(X is easily seen to be a segment of ξ). For the margins, this equality
is obtained in [1, Lem. 9.2], whose proof is valid without any need for
completeness. For the turnouts, this equality is immediately true in the
complete case. In the case of ranking votes, it suffices to observe that
the X restriction of the original Llull matrix is complete. This is true
because of the following implications: (i) vxy = 1 for some y ∈ A implies
that x is explicitly mentioned in all of the ranking votes; and (ii) x being
explicitly mentioned in all of the ranking votes implies that txy = 1 for
any y ∈ A.
Theorem 4.4. The CLC-Zermelo fractions depend continuously on the
original Llull matrix.
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Proof: This is a consequence of the continuity of the mappings P and Z.
The former is guaranteed by [2, Thm. 6.1] and the latter by Theorems 2.2
and 2.1.
Theorem 4.5. The CLC-Zermelo fractions comply with the Condorcet–
Smith principle: If A is partitioned in two sets X and Y with the property
that vxy > 1/2 for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , then for any such x and y one
has either ϕx > ϕy or ϕx = ϕy = 0.
Proof: Let us assume that the original Llull matrix is in the situa-
tion considered by the Condorcet–Smith principle. According to [2,
Thm. 8.1], the mean ranks Rx of the projected Llull matrix (v
pi
xy) satisfy
the inequality Rx < Ry for any x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . In terms of the mean
preference scores ρx, which are related to the mean ranks r¯x = Rx by
the linear decreasing transformation (12), we get therefore ρx > ρy for
any such x and y. So, it suffices to combine that result with Theorem 3.5
of the preceding section.
Let us assume that all the individual preferences are reversed, or
equivalently, that the Llull matrix is replaced by its transpose. As a
result of such a transformation, one would expect the final ranking to
be reversed. This condition is known in the literature by the name of
inversion [4, 9].
Zermelo’s method by itself is easily seen to satisfy this condition, at
least in the irreducible case. More precisely, in this case the strengths
for the transposed matrix are proportional to 1/ϕx, where ϕx are the
strengths for the original matrix. In the reducible case, the positive
strengths move from the top-dominant component to the bottom-domi-
nated one (whenever the latter exists).
The following results establish the inversion property for the mean
preference scores of the CLC-projected Llull matrix as well as for the
CLC-Zermelo fractions (except for the ties between options with vanish-
ing fractions).
Theorem 4.6. Assume that all of the binary preferences are reversed,
i. e. the scores (vxy) are replaced by (v˜xy), where v˜xy = vyx. Let ρx
and ρ˜x be the mean preference scores of the respective CLC-projected
Llull matrices. They behave in the following way: ρx > ρy ⇒ ρ˜x < ρ˜y.
Proof: Let us begin by noticing that the respective indirect scores satisfy
(79) v˜∗xy = v
∗
yx,
which is clear from (13).
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Consider now the respective CLC-projected Llull matrices (vpixy) and
(v˜pixy). In [1, §2.4] and [2, §2.1, Step 2] it is seen that the admissible orders
for (vpixy) are characterized as follows: xy ∈ ξ if and only if v∗xy ≥ v∗yx. Let
us fix such an order ξ and let ξ˜ be its reverse. Using (79), the preceding
double implication can be rewritten as yx ∈ ξ˜ if and only if v˜∗yx ≥ v˜∗xy,
which ensures ξ˜ to be an admissible order for (v˜pixy).
We will now apply Lemma 3.4 to the CLC matrices (vpixy) and (v˜
pi
xy).
Using part (a) of that lemma – as well as its contrapositive – we get the
following implication: ρx > ρy ⇒ xy ∈ ξ ⇒ yx ∈ ξ˜ ⇒ ρ˜y ≥ ρ˜x.
In order to complete the proof, it suffices to show that ρ˜y = ρ˜x ⇔
ρx = ρy. To this effect, we can restrict ourselves to the case where
y immediately follows x in the order ξ. In fact, having ρy = ρx and
x ξ z ξ y clearly implies ρy = ρz = ρx. So we can assume y = x′.
By part (d) of Lemma 3.4, our aim amounts at showing that v˜pixx′ =
v˜pix′x ⇔ vpixx′ = vpix′x. Now, equations (20), (11), and (7) of [2] ensure
that vpixx′ − vpix′x = min{v∗pq − v∗qp | p −
ξ x, x′ −
ξ q}. Using (79) as well
as the fact that ξ˜ is the reverse of ξ, the right-hand side transforms
into the analogous expression that corresponds to v˜pix′x− v˜pixx′ . So we get
v˜pix′x−v˜pixx′ = vpixx′−vpix′x, which entails the claimed double implication.
Remark. In the complete case these arguments together with the formu-
las for vpixy given in [1] show that the CLC projection commutes then with
transposition. This commutability is not true in the general incomplete
case.
Corollary 4.7. In the conditions of the preceding theorem the CLC-Zer-
melo fractions behave in the following way: ϕx>ϕy ⇒ either ϕ˜x< ϕ˜y
or ϕ˜x = ϕ˜y = 0.
Proof: Again, it suffices to combine the preceding result with Theo-
rem 3.5 of the preceding section.
The next theorem is concerned with clone consistency. In this con-
nection we make use of the notion of autonomous sets. A subset C ⊆ A
is said to be autonomous for a binary relation η when each element from
outside C relates to all elements of C in the same way; more precisely,
when, for any x 6∈ C, having ax ∈ η for some a ∈ C implies bx ∈ η for
any b ∈ C, and similarly, having xa ∈ η for some a ∈ C implies xb ∈ η
for any b ∈ C. More generally, a subset C ⊆ A will be said to be au-
tonomous for a valued relation (vxy) when the equalities vax = vbx and
vxa = vxb hold whenever a, b ∈ C and x 6∈ C. For more details about
the notion of autonomous set and the property of clone consistency we
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refer the reader to [1, §11]. Autonomous sets are also considered in [3],
where they are called macrovertices.
Theorem 4.8. The CLC-Zermelo fractions have the following property
of clone consistency. Assume that C ⊂ A is an autonomous set for each
of the individual votes. Assume also that either C ⊆ X or C ⊇ A \X,
where X = {x ∈ A | ϕx > 0}. Under these hypotheses one has the
following facts:
(a) C is autonomous for the ranking determined by the CLC-Zermelo
fractions; and
(b) contracting C to a single option in all of the individual votes has
no other effect in that ranking than getting the same contraction.
Proof: Once more, it suffices again to combine [2, Thm. 8.2] with The-
orem 3.5 of the preceding section.
Finally, the following result considers the effect of raising a particular
option a to a more preferred status in the individual ballots without any
change in the preferences about the other options.
Theorem 4.9. Assume that the scores vxy are modified into new val-
ues v˜xy such that
(80) v˜ay ≥ vay, v˜xa ≤ vxa, v˜xy = vxy, ∀x, y 6= a.
In these circumstances the CLC-Zermelo fractions behave in the follow-
ing way: ϕa > ϕy ⇒ ϕ˜a ≥ ϕ˜y.
Proof: According to [2, Thm. 8.4], the mean ranks Rx of the projected
Llull matrix (vpixy) behave in the following way: Ra < Ry ⇒ R˜a ≤ R˜y.
In terms of the mean preference scores ρx, which are related to the mean
ranks r¯x = Rx by the linear decreasing transformation (12), we have
therefore ρa > ρy ⇒ ρ˜a ≥ ρ˜y. So, it suffices to combine this with
Theorem 3.5 of the present article.
5. Concluding remarks
5.1. In this subsection we look at the possibility of achieving the same
properties by means of other methods.
A classical idea to be considered in this connection is rating the op-
tions by means of a non-negative right eigenvector of the paired-compari-
son matrix. This approach arises naturally as a refinement of the mean
preference scores. In fact, the mean preference score of x combines the
preference scores vxy (y 6= x) with equal weights. However, one can
argue that a given preference score over a highly rated option y should
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convey more value to x than the same preference score over a lowly rated
option y. This leads to looking for a system of ratings (τx) that satisfy
a relationship of the form
∑
y 6=x vxy τy = λ τx for some λ > 0. In confor-
mity with the idea of mixing proportions, one requires also τx ≥ 0 and∑
x τx = 1. In other words, (τx) should be a non-negative right eigen-
vector of the matrix that is obtained from (vxy) by filling the diagonal
with zeroes, and the corresponding eigenvalue should be positive. One
can look for such an eigenvector by solving the preceding equations in
a direct way. Alternatively, one can often approach it by an iterative
procedure of the form τ
(n+1)
x =
∑
y 6=x vxy τ
(n)
y starting from a positive
vector τ (0). Usually one takes τ
(0)
x = 1/N for all x (recall that N is the
number of options) in which case the τ
(1)
x are proportional to the mean
preference scores.
This idea was put forward in 1895 by Edmund Landau in his first pub-
lished mathematical paper [12]. Landau was motivated by chess tourna-
ments, where some rating methods had been introduced that amounted
to using the rating τ (2). He returned to the subject in 1914 [13], after
Oskar Perron and Georg Frobenius had proven their celebrated theorem
that guarantees the existence and uniqueness of such a non-negative
eigenvector in the case of an irreducible non-negative matrix. Forty
years later, the same idea was proposed by T. H. Wei [23]2 and Maurice
G. Kendall [11].
In his second paper on the subject, Landau considered the condition
of unanimous decomposition, more specifically its part (a) as stated in
page 101, as a natural constraint for selecting among the several non-
negative eigenvectors that can exist in the event of an unanimous decom-
position [13, p. 201]. However, one can see that this constraint conflicts
with the condition of continuity that we would like also to be satisfied.
Let us take, for instance, the following matrix:
(81) V =
a 1−  1− 
 b 1/2
 1/2 c
.
For  > 0 (and less than 1) its unique non-negative eigenvector (unique
up to multiplication by a positive number) is(
8(1− )(1 +
√
1 + 32− 322)−1, 1, 1)T,
2We have not been able to check reference [23].
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whose limit as ↓0 is (4, 1, 1)T. However, this is not a multiple of (1, 0, 0)T,
the rating that the condition of unanimous decomposition requires for
 = 0. (Notice that both (4, 1, 1)T and (1, 0, 0)T are non-negative eigen-
vectors of V0 and that their corresponding eigenvalues are respectively
1/2 and 0.)
This and other problems seem to disappear for a method that can be
viewed as a derivation of the preceding one, namely the so-called fair-
bets method, proposed more or less independently by Henry E. Daniels
in 1969 [7] and by John W. Moon and Norman J. Pullman in 1970 [17].
The fair bets, that we will denote by ψx, have the following meaning:
Let us interpret the paired-comparison scores vxy as numbers of victories
of x over y. We will assume that every time that a player x beats another
one y, the latter pays to the former the amount ψy. The fair bets are
the values that result in no player winning nor losing any money. In
other words, for every x one should have the equality
∑
y 6=x vxyψy =∑
y 6=x vyxψx. As before, together with these equations one requires also
ψx ≥ 0 and
∑
x ψx = 1.
The fair bets are easily seen to have good behaviour in connection
with the conditions of single-choice voting consistency and unanimous
decomposition. A preliminary exploration suggests that they also de-
pend continuously on the preference scores even in the neighbourhood
of a reducible matrix. For instance, in the case of (81) they are propor-
tional to (1− , , )T.
On the other hand, they do not satisfy the Condorcet principle (in
common with the mean preference scores and Zermelo’s strengths). For
instance, in the case of (1)–(2) one gets the following values: a: 0.323,
b: 0.378, c: 0.174, d: 0.124, where b gets the largest fraction in spite of
the fact that a has a majority of first placings.
However, the experience of this article on Zermelo’s method suggests
that combining the CLC projection with the fair-bets method could also
give a method with the desired properties, including the Condorcet–
Smith principle. By the way, in the case of (1)–(2), this combined pro-
cedure gives the following results: a: 0.325, b: 0.286, c: 0.214, d: 0.175.
So we pose the two following questions:
Open question 1. Are the fair bets continuous functions of the prefer-
ence scores even in the neighbourhood of a reducible matrix?
Open question 2. Is the Condorcet–Smith principle satisfied when the
fair bets are preceded by the CLC projection?
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In contrast to Zermelo’s method, the fair bets are known to violate
the condition of inversion [9, Ex. 4.4]. However, numerical experiments
suggest that the following question may still have a positive answer:
Open question 3. Do the fair bets have the property of inversion when
they are preceded by the CLC projection?
5.2. In Theorem 4.9 we considered the effect of raising a particular
option a to a more preferred status in the individual ballots without any
change in the preferences about the other options. Besides the property
that was obtained in that theorem, in this situation it would be quite
desirable to have an increase in the fraction associated with a: ϕ˜a ≥ ϕa.
This condition of quantitative monotonicity was considered by Landau
in [13], where it is shown that this condition is violated by the right
non-negative eigenvector even in the irreducible case.
Zermelo’s method is ensured to have this property [24, p. 444]. How-
ever, this is not true for Zermelo’s method preceded by the CLC projec-
tion, since the latter does not have good properties in this connection
(which motivated the open question 1 of [1]).
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